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ARTICLES
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
WEINGARTEN DOCTRINE: THE
BOARD SHIFTS TO THE RIGHT
A decade ago, the Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Weingarten,1 en-
dorsed the policy that an employee has the right, under section 7'
of the National Labor Relations Act,3 to be accompanied by a rep-
resentative when summoned to an interview which the employee
reasonably believes may result in the imposition of discipline.' An
employer's denial of this right, the Court said, is an unfair labor
practice under section 8(a)(1) of the Act.'
1. 420 U.S. 251 (1975). In NLRB v. Weingarten, an employer interviewed an employee
suspected of theft. Id. at 254. The employer denied the employee's requests to admit a
union representative to the meeting. Id. Although no discipline was administered, the
union instituted an unfair labor practice proceeding concerning the refusal to allow a rep-
resentative at the interview. Id. at 255-56.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act)
provides that "employees shall have the right to self-organize, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection." Id.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982). The Act, commonly known as the Wagner Act, was
passed in 1935; it sought to enhance the power of labor to equal roughly that of manage-
ment in order to promote industrial peace during the Depression. See generally B. TAYLOR &
F. WrrmEY,. LAOR RELATIONS LAW 153-60 (1971).
4. 420 U.S. at 253. See also J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446, 449-50 (National
Labor Relations Board decision establishing the section 7 basis of the representation right).
enforcement denied, 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that section 7 does not extend to
merely investigative interviews). The Supreme Court found the construction of section 7
employed by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to be a "permissible" one. 420
U.S. at 260. This construction is universally recognized, even by the seemingly hostile
opinions of the current NLRB. Set Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. No. 55, slip op.
(Feb. 22, 1985), 118 L.R.R.M. 1329, 1330 (1985).
5. 420 U.S. at 257 (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 158(aXl) (1982)). Unfair labor practices
under the Act include employer attempts to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of rights guaranteed in [section 7]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(aXI) (1982). See gener-
ally Note, Weingarten and Its Progeny: The Expanding Right of Employee Representation Under
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 11 Cum. L Rzv. 421. 425-32 (1981) (discussion
Weingarten
While the decision outlined the elements of the employee's
right to representative accompaniment,' the details of the applica-
tion of this right have been wrestled with by the National Labor
Relations Board (hereinafter "the Board" or "the NLRB") and
the courts for ten years.7 It is suggested that expansion of these
rights, which reached a peak under President Carter's Board, has
begun a process of reversal fueled by the pro-management philos-
ophies of the Reagan Board.$ This article will review three recent
decisions of the NLRB in the Weingarten area: Taracorp Indus-
tries,' Sears, Roebuck and Co.,10 and Prudential Insurance Co."
of section 7 basis for the representational rights).
6. See 420 U.S. at 256-60. The Court in Weingarten first determined that the represen-
tation right springs from the section 7 protection of concerted action undertaken by em-
ployees for their mutual aid and protection. Id. at 256-57. Second, the Court said, the
representation right can only be triggered by the employee's request. Id. at 257. Third, the
opinion stated that the right only arises in situations where the employee reasonably be-
lieves discipline will result from the investigation. Id. Fourth, the Court attenuated the
impact of this right on the employer by permitting the employer to decline to conduct the
interview under such conditions and allowing the employer to pursue the investigation
through independent means. Id. at 258. This provision leaves the decision up to the em-
ployee, who could choose to consent to the interview without his representative or to forgo
any interview and its attendant benefits. Id. Lastly, the Court characterized the function of
the representative as that of an assistant to the employee, possibly clarifying facts, or sug-
gesting other employees who have knowledge of them. Id. at 259-60. Not only need the
employer not bargain with the representative, he need not listen, at that time, to anyone
but the employee. Id. at 260.
7. See, *.g., Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 403, 411 (9th Cir. 1978) (rights do
not attach at an interview conducted merely to explain disciplinary action); NLRB v. Certi-
fied Grocers of California, Ltd., 587 F.2d 449, 451 (9th Cir. 1978) (meeting where em-
ployer warns employees fails to give rise to Weingarten rights); Mt. Vernon Tanker Co. v.
NLRB, 549 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1977) (formal logging of charges against a seaman was
not an investigative interview in the Weingarten sense). See generally Hill, We Only Promised
You a "Weingarten"...., 6 Oi.t Crrv U.L RLrv. 395, 401-08 (1981) (noting the impact of
various courts' constructions of Weingarten rights and their subsequent impact on Board
decisions); Comment, The Repercussions of Weingarten: An Employee's Right to Representation
at Investigatory Interviews, 64 MARQ. L ILxv. 173, 178-201 (1980) (broad survey of caselaw
construing Weingarten principles in particular applications).
8. See Modjeska, The Reagan NLRB, Phase 1, 46 Omo ST. L.J 95, 95 (1985) (noting ab-
rupt change in the Board's course); see also Gregory, The Employee's Right to Representation
During Employer Investigatory Interviews: A Critical Analysis of the Evolution of Weingarten
Prinaples, 28 Vi-i L REv. 572, 594-620 (1983) (detailed review of decisions of previous
Board).
9. 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54 (Dec. 12, 1984), 117 L.R.R.M. 1497 (1984). In Taracorp, the
Board reversed the earlier NLRB precedent, Kraft Foods, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 598, 605
(1980). 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54, slip op. at 4, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1497. The Taracorp decision
banned any "make-whole" remedy for violation of employee rights where discipline was
meted out "for cause" and not for the employee's assertion of Weingarten rights. 273
N.L.R.B. No. 54, slip op. at 7 n.12, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1499 n.12. "Make-whole" remedies
are those which seek to place the employee in the same position he enjoyed prior to the
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These cases highlight the retrenchment of the Board from the ex-
pansion of employee rights and represent the concurrent increase
in recognition of employers' rights." Each of these cases marks a
regression within the principles of the Weingarten doctrine."2 It is
submitted that these decisions evidence an attempt by the NLRB
to implement an ideological shift and to nullify the Weingarten de-
cision, an endeavor which may achieve practical results, but leaves
a residue of weak, unsound law.
I. Weingarten VIOLATIONS AND THE MAKE-WHOLE REMEDY
The Taracorp Board began its current revision of the Weingarten
doctrine with a limitation of the doctrine's remedial power. 4 The
issue of remedies available to correct or prevent unfair labor prac-
tices in the Weingarten area revolves around the construction of
National Labor Relations Act section 10(c), which provides that
employees disciplined for cause are ineligible for make-whole re-
lief.1' The NLRB had not always applied the plain meaning of the
"for cause" wording of the provision." In the 1980 Kraft Foods,
violation; they include, most commonly, reinstatement and back pay. See R. GORMAN, BASIC
TEXT ON LABoR LAW: UNIONMZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 536-37 (1976).
10. 274 N.L.R.B. No. 55 (Feb. 22, 1985), 118 L.R.R.M. 1329 (1985). In Sears, Roebuck,
the Board reversed earlier precedent, Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010
(1982), which held that Wiengarten rights apply to all employees, whether unionized or not.
262 N.L.R.B. at 1012-16. The Sears, Roebuck decision limits application of the rights to
unorganized workers. 118 L.R.R.M. at 130 (1985).
11. 275 N.L.R.B. No. 30 (Apr. 25. 1985), 119 L.R.R.M. 1073 (1985). In Prudential, the
NLRB held that a collective bargaining agreement clause can effectively waive its mem-
bers' Weingarten rights. 119 L.R.R.M. 1074-75.
12. Cf Modjeska, supra note 8, at 95-131 (notes the haste with which the current Board
applied this Administration's philosophies).
13. See infra notes 27-58 and accompanying text (discussing Taracorp); infra notes 88-
116 and accompanying text (discussing Sears, Roebuck); infra notes 147-54 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Prudentia).
14. See 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54 (Dec. 12, 1984). 117 L.R.R.M. 1497, 1498 (1984). The
National Labor Relations Act empowers the Board to prevent unfair labor practices, 29
U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982), and to remedy such practices through "affirmative action including
reinstatement .. .with .. .backpay .... " Id. § 160(c).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). Section 160(c) provides in pertinent part: "No order of
the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been
suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was
suspended or discharged for cause." Id.
16. See, e.g., United States Postal Service, 241 N.L.R.B. 141, 141 (1979) (fruit of crimi-
nal investigation conducted by employer cannot be used to discipline employee unless
union representative was permitted to attend criminal interview); Anchortank, Inc., 239
Weingarten
Inc. decision, the Board established a test for the applicability of
make-whole remedies.1 7 If an employee is disciplined for conduct
which was the subject of an interview where Weingarten rights
were violated, make-whole relief will be available unless the em-
ployer demonstrates that the disciplinary decision was not based
on information gained at that interview." The Circuits, however,
did not endorse (nor completely reject) the NLRB test of Kraft
Foods.1'
N.L.R.B. 240, 241 (1978) (employer's failure to honor Weingarten rights rendered unlawful
a discharge otherwise lawful), modified, 618 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1980); Potter Electric Sig-
nal Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 1289, 1292 n.8 (1978) (breach of Weingarten safeguards "tainted not
only the conduct of the interview, but any investigation subsequently conducted"), enforce-
ment denied, 600 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1979); Certified Grocers of California, Ltd., 227
N.L.R.B. 1211, 1215 (1977) (suspension of employee unlawful even though it stemmed
from investigation of his allegedly low productivity), enforcement denied, 587 F.2d 449 (9th
Cir. 1978).
17. See Kraft Foods Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 598, 598 (1980).
18. Id. Initially, under the Krafi Foods test, the Board determines if the General Coun-
sel has made a prinafacie showing that a make-whole remedy is appropriate. Id. This show-
ing is achieved by establishing that there was an interview at which Weingarten rights were
violated and that the employee involved was disciplined for the conduct which was the
subject of the interview. Id. Upon this showing, the burden then shifts to the respondent
employer to demonstrate that the decision to impose discipline upon the employee was not
based on information obtained at the unlawful interview. Id. If the employer meets this
burden, a make-whole remedy will not be applied; the Board will be limited to a cease-and-
desist order. Id.
19. See Pacific Tel. & Tel. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 134, 137-38 (9th Cir. 1983). The Pacific
TeL &I Te. court, the only one to consider directly the Kraft Foods test, held the NLRB
standard to be incorrect, and found the existence of "cause" ended the inquiry. Id. The
Eighth Circuit elucidated the elements of the "for cause" test of section 10(c). See NLRB v.
Potter Elec. Signal Co., 600 F.2d 120, 123-24 (8th Cir. 1979). The court harkened back to
the analysis of section 10(c) suggested by the Supreme Court in Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). 600 F.2d at 124. The Fibreboard Court held that the
legislative history of section 10(c) showed the congressional intent that union activity can-
not be a shield for employee misconduct. 379 U.S. at 217 n. 11. Therefore, according to
Potter Elec., an employee's discharge for malfeasance cannot give rise to a make-whole rem-
edy regardless of the existence of a Weingarten violation. 600 F.2d at 123.
Other circuits accepted the possibility of full relief despite the strictures of section 10(c).
For example, the Seventh Circuit proposed a modified Kraft Foods test under which the
employer would escape liability by showing the existence of evidence, independent of the
unlawful interview, sufficient to support discipline. See NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 674
F.2d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 1982). Similarly, the Sixth Circuit developed a standard under
which the employer's burden was met by the mere existence of independent evidence,
without a showing of reliance or sufficiency. See General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 674 F.2d
576, 577-78 (6th Cir. 1982).
Other non-Weingarten cases have construed section 10(c). See, e.g., NLRB v. Haberman
Const. Co., 641 F.2d 351, 361-62 (5th Cir. 1981) (remedies seeking to ameliorate condi-
tions which would exist in any event are punitive and unenforceable); Alfred M. Lewis, Inc.
v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978) (section 10(c) will not bar make-whole remedy
43
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A. Taracorp: Board Reversal
In Taracorp, the Board overruled the Kraft Foods standard"*
finding that it fails under a section 10(c) analysis, as well as under
general policy grounds." The decision reads section 10(c) as a re-
striction upon the issuance of make-whole remedies, which will
not be available if the discipline is imposed for cause." Only
where the discipline was the result of an unfair labor practice, that
is, not for cause, will the employee be eligible for the full rem-
edy." In the Weingarten setting, this rule is limited to situations
where employees are disciplined for asserting their Weingarten
rights." Absent the required nexus between the assertion of Wein-
garten rights and the discipline, a make-whole remedy is barred as
where sufficient nexus exists between unfair labor practice and discipline), modified, 681
F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1982).
20. 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54, slip op. at 4, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498; see supra note 18.
21. 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54, slip op. at 4, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498. The Board stated that
"make-whole relief in the context of a Weingarten violation is contrary to the specific reme-
dial restriction contained in Section 10(c), the general remedial framework of the Act, and,
independent of those restrictions constitutes bad policy." Id.
22. Id. at 5, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498. The Board in Taracorp cited the language of the
Supreme Court in Fibreboard Paper Products which barred application of the make-whole
remedy for discipline based on employee misconduct. Id. at 5 n.9, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498
n.9.
25. 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54, slip op. at 6, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1499. Where an employer
unlawfully imposes work quotas without due bargaining, employees discharged for failing
to perform adequately under them can be reinstated since the discipline arose directly
from the employer's unfair labor practice. Id. at 6 n.10, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1499 n.10.
24. 275 N.L.R.B. No. 54, slip op. at 7 n.12, 117 L.R.R.M.-at 1499 n.12. The Taracorp
Board reasoned that employee discharges for cause will not be remedied regardless of the
acccompanying Weingarten violation because the worker's misconduct was the basis of the
discipline, not the Weingarten breach. Id. at 7-8, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498; see also Montgom-
ery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir. 1981) ('employees effected their
own discharge. . . the [Weingartan violation was simply incidental').
Subsequent Board decisions have likewise found no nexus between the unfair labor prac-
tice of the Weingarten violation and the imposed discipline. E.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 275
N.L.R.B. No. 27 (Apr. 12, 1985), 118 L.R.R.M. 1645, 1646 (1985) (discharge due to mal-
feasance, not the Wengarten violation, so make-whole remedy denied); Radisson Muehle-
bach Hotel, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 183 (Jan. 17, 1985), 118 L.R.R.M. 1601, 1602 (1985)
(cease-and-desist order only remedy available where discipline not for the assertion of Wein-
garten rights); Greyhound Lines, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. No. 180 (Jan. 15, 1985), 118 L.R.R.M.
1199, 1200 (1985) (where discipline imposed for insubordination, no back pay remedy
available); Montgomery Ward & Co., 273 N.L.R.B. No. 154 (Dec. 14, 1984), 118 L.R.R.M.
1025, 1026 (1984) (employee confessed during an unlawful interview to stealing; remedy
for discharge limited to a cease-and-desist order); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 273
N.L.R.B. No. 95 (Dec. 14, 1984), 118 L.R.R.M. 1087, 1088 (1984) (reinstatement denied
where employee not disciplined for assertion of Weingartun rights, but for alleged misuse of
company property).
Weingarten
"punitive."''  The Board also criticized the elaborate workplace
rules which have developed around the Weingarten doctrine as
"bad policy," and as exceeding the scope of the original
decision."
The decision to reverse Kraft Foods was based primarily on the
current Board's reading of section 10(c). 27 The key phrase in this
section is "for cause."28 Taracorp defines "cause" by stating the
oft-cited proposition that "[m]anagement can discharge for good
cause, bad cause, or no cause at all" provided that the purpose
behind such action is not contrary to the NLRA.2 This formula-
tion means "cause" is any reason (or no reason) which is not pro-
hibited by law." According to the Board, the purpose behind the
enactment of section 10(c) was to bar interference with an em-
ployer's right to do that which he is not prohibited from doing."1
The Board supports this interpretation with the Supreme Court's
analysis of section 10(c) from the 1964 Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp. v. NLRB decision."
Fibreboard held that section 10(c) precludes reinstatement for
employees discharged for misconduct, essentially defining "cause"
as misconduct. 8 A closer review of the legislative history dis-
25. 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54, slip op. at 8, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498. The Board in Taracorp
cited Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961), which held that the power
of the Board is remedial, not punitive, and is to be used to restrain or remove violations
and their consequences. 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54, slip op. at 8, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498.
26. 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54, slip op. at 8-9, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1499. The Board character-
ized the growth of law in the Weingarten field as a "labyrinth of rules and procedures analo-
gous to the law of criminal procedure." Id. Expansion of rights in this area has served "to
encourage the transformation of investigative interviews into formalized adversarial pro-
ceedings." Id. Such a result, the Board said, tempts employers to forgo the interviews alto-
gether. Id.
27. See 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54, slip op. at 5, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982); see supra note 15.
29. 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54 slip op. at 5 n.8, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498 n.8 (citing NLRB v.
Columbus Marble Works, 233 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1956)). Purposes contrary to the Act
are those which discriminate against employees in order to influence them concerning la-
bor organization membership. 29 U.S.C. § 158(aX3) (1982).
30. See Columbus Marble Works, 233 F.2d at 413.
31. 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54, slip op. at 4 n.5, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498 n.5.
32. 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54, slip op. at 5 n.9, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498 n.9 (citing Fibreboard
Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 217 (1964)).
33. 379 U.S. at 217. The Fibreboard Court analyzed the legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley amendments to section 10(c). noting that the House Report for section 10(c) indi-
cated the provision was intended to end the belief that union activity "carries with it a
license to loaf, wander about the plants, refuse to work, waste time, break rules, and en-
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cussed in Fibreboard establishes that the meaning of "cause" in
section 10(c) is indeed "misconduct."'" The intent of Congress in
the passage of this reform provision was to bring an end to a per-
ceived NLRB practice of reinstating malfeasant employees by in-
ferring that the discipline was imposed due to their union involve-
ment, rather than their misconduct." The trigger, then, for the
restrictions of section 10(c) is a finding of misconduct, or another
affirmative basis for discipline." The Taracorp definition of cause
is any reason not prohibited.$' The Board's reliance on Fibreboard
is inapposite; Fibreboard noted the Congressional intent to apply a
misconduct standard." It is suggested that misconduct under
Fibreboard is a substantive term which requires an affirmative find-
ing of malfeasance. This meaning does not comport with the
Taracorp standard which enables an employer to discharge an em-
ployee at will, so long as not for a prohibited reason."
The finding of malfeasance needed to trigger the section 10(c)
remedial restriction may result from an investigative interview of
gage in incivilities and other disorders and misconduct." 379 U.S. at 217 n.1 I (citing H. R.
REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 42 (1947)). The House Conference Report, also cited
in Fibreboard, refers to forms of malfeasance including "communist activities" and interfer-
ence with war production. 379 U.S. at 217 n.ll (citing H. R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., 55 (1947)).
34. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
35. H. R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 42, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HisTORV OF THE LABoR MANAGEMENT Rm.ArToNs Acr, 1947, 333 (1948) [hereinafter cited
as LEGISLArIVE Hs-roavJ. The House Report found that the Board, while admitting that an
employee was guilty of gross misconduct, nevertheless frequently reinstated him, "infer-
ring that because he [engaged in union activity], this, and not his misconduct, was the
reason for the discharge." Id. The Taft-Hartley section 10(c) was enacted to ensure that
the Board would no longer infer the existence of an improper motive where the evidence
showed the discharge was for cause. H. K. REP. No. 245 at 43, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATiVE
HmToiy at 334. Senator Taft, commenting upon the differences between the House and
Senate bills, noted that the Board had apparently been correcting its policy of excessive
reinstatement and that the ongoing problems resulting from Board protection of "unlawful
concerted activities" would be remedied by the inclusion of the "for cause" language. 93
CONG. RE C 6593, 6600 (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in 2 LEG SL A-VE HMToRY at
1539.
36. 379 U.S. at 217. The Supreme Court, in Fibreboard, recognized the misconduct
standard through its review of the provision's legislative history. Id.; see also supra notes 33-
35. Cf. Golden Day Schools, Inc. v. NLRB, 644 F.2d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 1981) (accepted
misconduct standard); Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 403, 412 (9th Cir. 1978)
(accepted Fibreboard interpretation of "cause" as misconduct).
37. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
38. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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the type contemplated under Weingarten.'0 The Supreme Court
established the employer's duty to allow a representative to be
present at the interview.41 Further, the presence of the represen-
tative was found to benefit each party.4' A breach of Weingarten
rights may be considered to result in a faulty finding of "cause."' 0
It is submitted that if the finding of misconduct ("cause") is sus-
pect, then the restrictions of section 10(c) do not necessarily be-
come operative and make-whole remedies should be available. "
It is suggested that the following standard would best effectuate
Weingarten rights 6 while protecting the legitimate prerogatives of
the employer: an employee will not be eligible for reinstatement if
the employer can show sufficient evidence of misconduct, which
was gained independently of the illegal interview."' The employer
would not be required to show that the unlawfully obtained evi-
dence was not used, but only that there existed independent evi-
dence of sufficient weight to enable an employer to determine the
employee's malfeasance.
40. Set Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 257. The Supreme Court, in outling the scope of the
Weingarten rights, specified that the rights arise only where the employee reasonably be-
lieves disciplinary action will ensue from the interview. Id.; see also Comment, supra note 7,
at 190 (discussion of the employee's reasonable belief). It is submitted that this require-
ment contemplates a similar "misconduct" standard in Weingarten cases, since the only way
in which an employee can attain a sense of impending discipline is if he believes the em-
ployer has reason to commence an investigation.
41. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260.
42. Id. at 262. The Weingarten representative can assist an employee "too fearful or
inarticulate" or "too ignorant to raise extenuating factors." Id. at 263. The employer is
aided by the elicitation of facts and the time saved by the representative's assistance in
expediting the matter. Id. The Court analogized the contribution of the representative to
the first stages of arbitration; such involvement can be advantageous to each party. Id. at
262 n.7. see also Gregory, supra note 8, at 613-15 (discussion of the role of the
representative).
43. 420 U.S. at 263-64. The Weingarten Court recognized that the representative may
have an impact on the employer's finding, not the least significant of which is vindication of
the employee. Id. Failure to observe the Weingarten protections have been held by the
Board to "taint" the employer's investigation. Potter Elec. Signal Co., 237 N.L.R.B. at
1292 n.8.
44. Cf. NLRB v. John Zink Co., 551 F.2d 799, 803 (10th Cir. 1977) (lack of certainty
will not preclude an award where employer's wrongful acts contribute to the uncertainty);
see also NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F.2d 569, 572-73 (5th Cir. 1966).
45. See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260; see also supra note 6. Effectuation of the policies of
the NLRA is a duty placed upon the Board by section 10(c). See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
46. See NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 674 F.2d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 1982).
47. Cf id. The proposed standard allows the employer to show evidence to support the
disciplinary action. Id. It is suggested that the sufficiency requirement should not be overly
47
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This approach would vitalize the employee's protections and, by
continuing the availability of the make-whole remedy, foster
greater attention by employers to Weingarten rights.46 The em-
ployer's interests are served by the assurance that an employee
disciplined for obvious misconduct will have no remedy." Where
the employer has no independent evidence, the safeguards remain
because this setting is fraught with the potential evils foreseen by
the Supreme Court.50
The Taracorp Board's second basis for restricting make-whole
remedies was to prohibit the Board from engaging in punitive
measures." To avoid being punitive, a Board order must be an
exercise geared to restrain violations and to remove the conse-
quences of such violations." The remedies of reinstatement and
back pay are among the NLRB's most effective weapons to re-
strain violations." Likewise, it is suggested that discipline stem-
ming from an unlawful interview is curable by the make-whole
remedy."
The Taracorp Board's third reason for its decision was that the
"labyrinth of rules" surrounding Weingarten constitutes "bad pol-
icy."" It is submitted that the veracity of this statement is irrele-
vant; the Supreme Court has declared that representation rights
burdensome, but something more than the mere existence of independent evidence would
suffice. To place a greater burden on the employer would put the Board in the position of
umpiring the employer's personnel management, which is not a proper function of the
NLRB. Cf. NLRB v. Jones & McLaughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1936) ("Act does not
interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select . . . or to dis-
charge"); accord Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n. v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 754, 760 n.8 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 327 (1984); G & H Prods. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d
1397, 1404 (7th Cir. 1983).
48. See R. GORMAN, supra note 9, at 532-33. Make-whole remedies are recognized as
more effective deterrents of willful violations. Id.
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982); supra note 46 and accompanying text.
50. See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 261-64.
51. Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54, slip op. at 8, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498. The Board
noted the restrictions on their power to order remedies which would constitute a "wind-
fall' to the employee. Id. Punitive measures and windfalls are considered together since a
windfall, which is a remedy that goes beyond making one whole, or bestows benefits in the
absence of an unfair labor practice, is considered punitive. 273 N.LR.B. No. 54, slip op. at
8. 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498 (citing Service Roofing Co., 200 N.L.R.B. 1015, 1017 (1972)).
52. Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961).
53. See L. MODJESKA, NLRB PRAcrlcE 1.11 (1983).
54. See supra note 44.
55. Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54, slip op. at 8-9, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1499.
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are necessary to effectuate a fundamental purpose of the Act,
eliminating the inequality of bargaining power between employer
and employee." As inconvenient or insignificant as they are sus-
ceptible of being characterized, these rights still exist as section 7
rights,8 7 and as such are due the deference afforded to other stat-
utory rights."8
II. THE APPLICATION OF Weingarten PROTECTION TO
UNORGANIZED EMPLOYEES
The second branch of the Weingarten doctrine recently curtailed
by the NLRB was its applicability to non-organized employees."9
Generally, court and Board opinions have supported the exten-
sion of Weingarten principles to unorganized workplaces," primar-
ily on section 7 grounds.1 The Board, however, reversed existing
precedent" in 1985 in Sears, Roebuck & Co. , holding that Wein-
garten protections depend upon the presence of an organized
representative."
During the late seventies and early eighties, NLRB proceedings
included discussions of the appropriateness of extending Wein-
garten principles to non-union employees.15 In Materials Research
56. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262.
57. Id. at 257-58. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
58. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(aXl) (1982) (failure to observe employee's section 7 rights is an
unfair labor practice).
59. See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. No. 55, slip op. at -, (Feb. 22, 1985). 118
L.R.R.M. 1329, 1329 (1985). The Board decided prior to Sears, Roebuck that Weingarten
rights devolve upon employees regardless of their organizational status. Materials Research
Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1014 (1982); see infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text; see
also Tokheim Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. 1658, 1658 (1982); Bodolay Packaging Machinery, Inc.,
263 N.L.R.B. 320, 320 (1982); Interstate Security Services, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 6, 6 (1982).
See generally Gregory, supra note 8, at 609-13 (tracing non-organized employees' Weingarten
rights through time of Materials Research).
60. See supra note 59 and infra note 71.
61. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. But see Texaco, Inc., L.A. Sales Ter-
minal, 179 N.L.R.B. 976, 977 (1969) (representational rights based on employer's duty to
bargain); Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594, 594 (1968) (same); Chevron Oil
Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 574, 574-75 (1967) (same). Beginning with Quality Manufacturing Co.,
195 N.L.R.B. 197, 198 (1972), modifed, 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 276
(1975), the companion case to Weingarten, the NLRB moved toward a section 7 standard.
195 N.L.R.B. at 198.
62. Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982).
63. 274 N.L.R.B. No. 55 (Feb. 22, 1985), 118 L.R.R.M. 1329 (1985).
64. 118 L.R.R.M. at 1329-30.
65. See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1146, 1166 (1980) (union or non-union
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Corp.," the Board recognized that Weingarten rights spring from
section 7 protection of concerted activity" and that this concerted
activity can only be triggered by the employee's request for assis-
tance." Furthermore, the Board held that since the right arises
under section 7 and since section 7 rights apply in both union and
non-union settings,6 ' Weingarten rights must be extended to unor-
ganized employees." The Materials Research rationale enjoyed
wide support in the circuits2'
status of representative irrelevant); Levingston Shipbuilding Co., 249 N.L.R.B. 1, 10
(1980) (Weingarten protections extend to unrepresented employees); Glomac Plastics, Inc.,
234 N.L.R.B. 1309, 1311 (1978) (representation rights grounded on section 7, which ap-
plies to all employees).
66. 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982).
67. Id. at 1011. The Board in Materials Research noted the Supreme Court's finding in
Weingarten that the employee's request for aid constituted "concerted activity" under sec-
tion 7. Id. (citing 420 U.S. at 260). Weingarten found that the representative in this setting
not only safeguards the particular employee, but adds to the security of all employees. 420
U.S. at 261.
In Materials Research the Board found that Weingarten rights do not emanate from the
section 9 rights of union exclusivity. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1012. Section 9 provides that the
formally designated collective bargaining representative "shall be the exclusive representa-
tives of all the employees.., for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment[.]" 29 U.S.C. §
159(a) (1982). The Weingarten representative's role was found by the Board not to rise to
the level of a bargaining representative. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1012.
68. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1012.
69. Id. The Board noted that "it is by now axiomatic" that section 7 rights apply re-
gardless of representational status. Id. See also Koch Supplies Inc. v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 1257,
1259 (8th Cir. 1981) (concerted activities need not take place in union setting if the em-
ployee contemplates group activity benefitting other employees); Vic Tanny Int'l Inc. v.
NLRB, 622 F.2d 237, 241 (6th Cir. 1980) (congressional intent behind section 7 was to
protect concerted activity by employees without regard to organizational status); United
Packinghouse, Food, and Allied Workers Int'l v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (concerted activity protected whether channeled through a union or not).
70. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1014. The "inequality of power" perceived by
the Weingarten Court is present whether there is a union or not; in order to combat it, it is
essential that unrepresented employees look to each other for mutual aid and protection.
Id.
71. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. (Chestnut Run) v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 1061, 1065-
66 (3d Cir. 1983), vacated, 733 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1984). In Chestnut Run the court noted
that the Weingarten majority had to be aware of the applicability of the section 7 rights
outside the union setting, and if the Supreme Court's holding was intended to be limited to
organized workers it could have so stated. 724 F.2d at 1065-66; accord, E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 707 F.2d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 1983) (since section 7 is not
limited to organized workers, Weingarten rights cannot be); Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618
F.2d 1153, 1157-58 (5th Cir. 1980) (employee's request for co-worker's representation is
protected concerted activity under section 7); Keokuk Gas Service Co. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d
328, 334 n. 14 (8th Cir. 1978) (section 7 applicable to non-union employees); Oil Chemical
and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 575, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (protection
Weingarten
A. Board Reversal: Sears, Roebuck & Co.
The Sears, Roebuck &, Co. decision," issued two months after
Taracorp," held that the Materials Research rationale was incor-
rect74 and "fully endorse[d]" the dissenting opinion in Materials
Research,' thereby subsuming the rationale of the dissent into the
new opinion."0
Chairman Van de Water's Materials Research dissent noted that
employers are not obliged to discuss terms and conditions of em-
ployment with any employee representative unless the representa-
tive is duly certified."7 Absent a union, he said, the employer is
free to deal with the employees individually.'5 The Materials Re-
search rule, the dissent held, sacrifices this right to deal individu-
ally by requiring recognition of a non-union representative. 7 The
Chairman equated the Weingarten representative with a collective
bargaining agent;"° the activities of the Weingarten representative,
like those of a union representative, constitute "dealing with" the
employer, he said."1 A body which "deals with" an employer con-
of concerted action not merely right to act with union), cet denied, 431 U.S. 966 (1977);
NLRB v. Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922, 931 (2d Cir. 1976) (section 7 protections apply
equally to union and non-union firms).
Justice Powell in his Weingarten dissent, stated, "[lit must be assumed that the section 7
right today recognized, affording the employees the right to act 'in concert' in employer
interviews, also exists in the absence of a recognized union." 420 U.S. at 270 n. I (Powell,
J., dissenting).
72. 274 N.L.R.B. No. 55 (Feb. 22, 1985), 118 L.R.R.M. 1329 (1985).
73. 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54 (Dec. 12, 1984), 117 L.R.R.M. 1497 (1984).
74. Sears, Roebuck, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1329.
75. See 262 N.L.R.B. at 1016 (Van de Water, dissenting); infra notes 77-83 and accom-
panying text.
76. Sears, Roebuck, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1329.
77. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1016 (Van de Water, dissenting). The dissent-
ing opinion in Materials Research cited NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I
(1937), and J.i. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944), for the proposition that an em-
ployer can deal freely and unilaterally with non-organized workers. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1016.
A reading of the cited cases, however, indicates that this terminology does not appear
there; rather, the cases involve an employer's ability, absent a recognized bargaining repre-
sentative, to enter into individual contracts with the employees. See Jones & Laughlin, 301
U.S. at 45;J.I. Case, 321 U.S. at 337.
78. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1019 (Van de Water, dissenting). The term
"deal with" figures prominently in the theoretical construct of Chairman Van de Water's
opinion. Id.; see also infra note 81 and accompanying text.
79. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1019 (Van de Water, dissenting).
80. Id.
81. Id. "Dealing with" is a term of art which contemplates a level of interaction be-
tween the employer and employees which is less than full "bargaining." NLRB v. Cabot
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cerning workers' terms and conditions of employment, continued
the opinion, is within the statutory definition of a "labor organiza-
tion."82 Therefore, concluded the Chairman, forced recognition
of a non-union Weingarten representative requires the employer to
bargain with a non-certified union without the NLRA-required
majority election.8
The Sears, Roebuck decision embellished upon the Van de Water
dissent by disputing the blanket protection found in section 7 by
Materials Research." The Board held that union and non-union
employees do not enjoy the same degree of protection under the
Act." The organizational structure contemplated by the NLRA
denotes the primacy of formal worker organization;" therefore,
Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 214-17 (1959); see infra note 102 and accompanying text.
82. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1019 (Van de Water, dissenting). National La-
bor Relations Act section 2(5) reads:
The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or any agency
or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concern-
ing grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or condi-
tions of work.
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982); see also Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 214.
83. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1019 (Van de Water, dissenting). The Sears, Roebuck Board noted:
"To place a Weingarten representative in a non-union setting is to require the employer to
recognize and deal with the equivalent of a union representative, contrary to the Act's
exclusivity principle." 118 L.R.R.M. at 1331. The "exclusivity principle" mentioned in
Sears, Roebuck relates to the exclusive right of the statutory representative, the union, to
engage in collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). The Materials Research dissent
noted the violence done to this NLRA provision by permitting Weingarten to apply to non-
union workers. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1019.
84. Sears, Roebud, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1330.
85. Id. at 1330. "The scope of section 7's protections may vary depending upon
whether employees are represented or unrepresented, and the section 7 rights of one
group cannot be mechanically transplanted to the other group at the expense of important
statutory policies." Id.
86. See id. In essence, the Board's theory is that the organizational rights of labor take
precedence over the rights individuals may enjoy under section 7. See id. Both the Sears,
Roebuck decision and the Materials Rsearch dissent found Emporium Capwell Co. v. West-
ern Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975), persuasive. See Sears, Roebuck, 118
L.R.R.M. at 1330; Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B.'at 1020 (Van de Water, dissenting). In
Emporium CapieU, employee activists engaged in concerted action against racial discrimina-
tion without the approval or participation of their union. 420 U.S. at 53-56. Although
their campaign against the employer was concerted action within the ambit of section 7,
the Supreme Court held that the union's right under section 9 to be the exclusive repre-
sentative of the workers was paramount to the workers' rights. Id. at 65-66. Thus employ-
ees could not seek to alter terms and conditions of their employment independent of their
union. id. at 69-70. Chairman Van de Water noted that the employees in Emporium Capwell
would have been protected under section 7 had there been no union, 262 N.L.R.B. at
1020, and the Sears, Roebuck Board concurred, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1330. The employees'
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Sears, Roebuck held that non-union employees are ineligible for
coverage under the Weingarten doctrine.0
The Sears, Roebuck rationale did not contest that Weingarten
rights emanate from section 7," nor did it refute the accepted
protection of concerted activity." Chairman Van de Water's dis-
sent to Materials Research observed that although the rights were
available to all, certain rights require the presence of a collective-
bargaining representative." An example of these rights is the
right to engage in collective bargaining;91 although existing under
section 7, it cannot become functional without a union.9 Further,
once this right becomes effective, it can only be exercised collec-
tively and not by individuals.9"
Weingarten rights were characterized in the Sears, Roebuck deci-
sion as bargaining rights." To support this construction, the
Board had to transform the Weingarten representative into a bar-
gaining agent."5 Chairman Van de Water's Materials Research dis-
sent applied the Supreme Court's Cabot Carbon rationale, deter-
rights could not "be pursued at the expense of the orderly collective-bargaining process
contemplated by the NLRA." Sears, Roebuck, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1330 (citing 420 U.S. at 69).
87. Sears, Roebuck, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1330. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours (Chestnut Run),
274 N.L.R.B. No. 176, slip op. at - (March 22, 1985), 118 L.R.R.M. 1555, 1556 n.7
(1985) (Weingarten protections withheld from non-union employee who refused to meet
with employer absent a representative).
88. See Sears, Roebuck, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1330. See also Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B.
at 1016 (Van de Water. dissenting).
89. 118 L.R.R.M. at 1330.
90. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1020 (Van de Water. dissenting).
91. Id.
92. Id. The right to act in concert to improve terms and conditions of employment is
an element of section 7. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). The right, however, remains inchoate
until a statutory bargaining representative is designated, at which time the right vests in
the employees collectively. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1020 (Van de Water,
dissenting).
93. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1020 (Van de Water, dissenting). That the re-
quest for a representative is concerted action under section 7 does not alter the primacy of
the collective rights under the statutory organizational plan. Id; see supra note 86.
94. Sears, Roebuck, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1330 (citing Materials Research dissent, 262
N.L.R.B. at 1020).
95. See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 259. The Supreme Court's Weingarten opinion estab-
lished the representative's role to be quite limited. Id. In order to apply the section 9(a)
union exclusivity principles, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982), and the section 8(aX5) duty of the
employer to bargain, 29 U.S.C. § 158(aX5) (1982), in the Weingarten context as did Chair-
man Van de Water, see 262 N.L.R.B. at 1017, it was necessary to recast the role of the
Weingarten representative into something akin to a union representative. See Weingarten,
420 U.S. at 259.
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mining that the Weingarten representative "deals with" the
employer." Moreover, under Cabot Carbon, an entity that "deals
with" an employer is a "labor organization;"' 7 therefore the Wein-
garten representative is a labor organization." Chairman Van de
Water noted, however, that the employer can only be required to
deal with a bona fide union;" thus, absent a statutory representa-
tive, the employer may deal unilaterally with the workers as indi-
viduals, and avoid recognition of Weingarten representatives.' ° It
is suggested that the Sears, Roebuck rationale fails in several re-
spects. The entity discussed by the Supreme Court in Cabot Carbon
was a formal body, created and dominated by the employer.' 0'
This organization bore many of the characteristics of a statutory
representative and thus was found to conform to the section 2(5)
definition of a "labor organization.'0 A Weingarten representa-
tive's activities, however, are limited to a small core of suggestions
96. See Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1016 n.30 (Van de Water, dissenting). "[Aln
entity 'deals with' an employer when, on behalf of employees, it engages in discussions with
the employer on matters relating to terms and conditions of employment, makes various
proposals, and offers suggestions to the employer." Id. This analysis was also employed in
the Sears, Roebuck decision. See 118 L.R.R.M. at 1331.
97. See Cabot Carbon. 360 U.S. at 213.
98. See Sears, Roebuck, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1331.
The Board has held that the representative must be allowed to speak, and is free to
make proposals and suggestions or to offer alternate discipline ... [Sluch functions
constitute 'dealing with' the employer and 'dealing with' an employer is a primary
indicum of labor organization status as well as a traditional union function.
Id.
99. See Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1019 (Van de Water, dissenting). "[l1n the
absence of a recognized or certified union an employer... cannot be compelled to recog-
nize any individual, group or organization as a representative ..... Id.
100. Id.; see also Sears, Roebuck, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1330.
101. See Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 218.
102. Id. In Cabot Carbon, the employer established "employee committees" to consider
"ideas and problems of mutual interest." Id. at 205. The Supreme Court held that these
committees were "labor organizations" under section 2(5), id. at 211-13, even though the
committees did not engage in collective bargaining& Id. at 212-13.
"Dealing with" is a section 2(5) standard, and it includes discussions covering the whole
scope of the employment relationship, as distinguished from "bargaining" in that the latter
carries with it the "unfettered power" of the party to insist on its position. Id. at 214. The
committees, once determined to be labor organizations, were subject to the section 8(aX2)
bar of employer domination, 29 U.S.C. § 158(aX2) (1982). See 360 U.S. at 218.
The committees included employees and dealt with grievances, labor disputes, wages,
hours and other conditions. Id. at 213-14. The conduct engaged in by the committees were
clearly prospective; that is, the proposals and the suggestions made on behalf of the employ-
ees were intended to affect future terms and conditions. Id.
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concerning a present matter; os his role is not intended to be ad-
versarial; 104 he cannot initiate discussion of general terms of em-
ployment;'" and he is powerless to propose alteration of the sub-
ject employee's duties.'" Since the Weingarten representative can
only engage in activities similar to the Cabot Carbon committees in
a most attenuated way," it is suggested that the representative
does not bear the same indicia of "dealing with" the employer as
contemplated by the Cabot Carbon Court.
Assuming that a Weingarten representative does "deal with" an
employer, it remains doubtful that he can properly be considered
a "labor organization. "108 Generally, such a finding is predicated
upon the existence of a more formal type of organization.'" Even
accepting the Weingarten representative as a "labor organization"
"dealing with" an employer, it is submitted that the Board's ra-
tionale still fails. The Board's position is that a properly qualified
union is the exclusive agent of the employee and that, under sec-
tion 8(a)(5), the employer must deal with that agent. 10 Since the
103. See Wengarten, 420 U.S. at 260. The representative deals only with the individual
employee; the assistance provided can only relate to the matter under investigation. 420
U.S. at 259-60. See generally Gregory, supra note 8, at 613-14.
104. See Weingartn, 420 U.S. at 263.
105. See id. at 259. "[T]he employer has no duty to bargain with any union representa-
tive who may be permitted to attend the investigatory interview .... [Wie are not giving
the Union any particular rights... which it otherwise was not able to secure during collec-
tive-bargaining negotiations." Id.
106. See id.
107. Compare Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 213-14 (committees considered terms and con-
ditions of employment as they affected employees unit-wide) with Weingarten, 420 U.S. at
260 (representative deals with the investigatory interview of one employee).
108. Se 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982); supra note 82.
109. See, e.g., East Chicago Rehabilitation Center v. NLRB, 710 F.2d 397, 404 (7th Cir.
1983) (spontaneously striking workers had neither organization nor purpose of dealing
with employer, and therefore, were not labor organization). CrLt denied, 465 U.S. 1065
(1985); NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 294 (6th Cir. 1982)
("labor organization" is involved in an ongoing association between management and em-
ployees); NLRB v. Long Beach Youth Center, 591 .F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 1979) (em-
ployees who met, signed union authorization cards, and drew up demands not a labor or-
ganization). It is suggested that the common thread running through these decisions is the
presence of some sense of permanence, an organization which addresses matters affecting
employees' terms and conditions of employment both at the moment as well as in the past
and in the future. Likewise, it is submitted, the Weingarten representative exists for the
moment, and carries no rights or obligations beyond the termination of the interview.
110. See Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1017 (Van de Water, dissenting). Section
9(a) provides that "representatives designated ... for the purposes of collective bargaining
... shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees . . . for the purposes of
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statutory obligation only applies to the union, the employer need
not deal with a Weingarten representative. 11' The linchpin of this
argument is the section 8(a)(5) provision; the Board's interpreta-
tion of it is erroneous because the Board refers to the employer's
duty under that section to deal with the union.11' The provision
states that the duty is to bargain."" As the Cabot Carbon Court
stated, "bargain" and "deal with" were neither understood nor
intended by Congress to be synonymous.114 The Sears, Roebuck
doctrine, as a necessary component of its theoretical basis, elevates
the Weingarten representative to the level of a certified union by
noting the representative's attenuated similarity to a "labor or-
ganization," an entity which in itself has no power to compel
bargaining.116
Weingarten rights should not be the subject of such tortured
analyses, attempting to categorize them as bargaining rights, when
the Supreme Court has conclusively recognized them as elements
of the section 7 protection of concerted activities.""
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages . . or other conditions of employ-
ment." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). Section 8(aX5) states that "[ilt shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of
his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a)." 29 U.S.C. § 158(aX5) (1982).
111. Sears, Roebuck, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1330.
112. See Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1017 (Van de Water. dissenting). "Section
8(aX5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to deal with the employ-
ees' exclusive representative ... ." Id.
113. 29 U.S.C. § 158(aX5) (1982); see supra note 110.
114. See Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 211 (legislative history of Wagner Act indicates that
Congress intended to reject term "bargaining" and apply "dealing" instead). See id. at 211-
12.
115. See Sears, Roebuck, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1330; supra note 82. Although the Court in
Cabot Carbon found the employer-dominated committees were "labor organizations," it did
not ascribe any extraordinary power to them. 360 U.S. at 214. Cabot Carbon applied the
NLRA sanctions against employer domination of labor organizations to the employee com-
mittees. Id. at 218. It is sugiested that if the Weigarten representative is a labor organiza-
tion, and if the NLRA requires the employer to deal with this organization under sections
9(a) and 8(aXS), then the Weirgarten representative must have full bargaining power. This
requirement would make the representative a far more formidable figure, and it is submit-
ted that it is unlikely the Reagan Board would seek to elevate the Weingarten representative
to such a potent status.
116. See Weigarten, 420 U.S. at 256-57, 260. The Board explained the Weingarten doc-
trine in the Stars, Roebuck decision as follows:
Weigartens rights stem from an employer action (an interview) which is reasonably
perceived by an employee as affecting his or her terms and conditions of employ-
ment (the potential imposition of discipline). The Board and the Supreme Court
have determined that an employee should not be required to participate in such an
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III. UNION WAIvR OF Weingarten RIGHrs
In Prudential Insurance Co.,117 the NLRB devised a third inroad
on the Weingarten doctrine, determining that a union has the au-
thority to waive its members' Weingarten rights.1 ' The decision
settled an issue that had been unresolved since the announcement
of the Weingarten opinion.""
The Supreme Court previously considered questions of union
waivability of non-Weingarten rights, determining that waivers not
interfering with the employees' union selection were valid.10
Waivers not interfering with the selection process were character-
ized as waivers of economic rights, and, therefore, permissible.",,
employer action alone, without his or her duly designated collective-bargaining rep-
resentative should such representation be requested.
118 L.R.R.M. at 1329-30.
117. 275 N.L.R.B. No. 30 (Apr. 25, 1985). 119 L.R.R.M. 1073 (1985).
118. 119 L.R.R.M. at 1075.
119. See 420 U.S. at 270-75 (Powell, J., dissenting). justice Powell noted that the ques-
tion of whether an employee's section 7 right to a Weingarten representative could be
waived by his union went unanswered by the majority. 420 U.S. at 275 n.8 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
The NLRB also avoided deciding this issue, but, one member, Chairman Miller, in 1972,
indicated his view that representational rights at investigatory interviews can be waived by
the collective bargaining agreement. See Western Electric Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 623, 626
(1972). Subsequent decisions (prior to Prudentia) addressed the question only hypotheti-
cally, "assuming" such waivers were possible without determining the issue. See, e.g.,
United States Postal Service, 256 N.L.R.B. 78, 80-81 (1981) (contract clause insufficient to
effect waiver), modified, 689 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982); Prudential Ins. Co., 251 N.L.R.B.
1591, 1592 (1980) (contract clause did not address Wengarten representative, so no waiver
was effectuated), enforcement denied, 661 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1981). Of all the circuit courts,
only the Fifth Circuit reached the question, holding that since the Weingarten rights are
"fundamental" and other "fundamental" rights, such as the right to strike, have been held
to be waivable, Wengarten rights must also be waivable. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. NLRB,
661 F.2d 398, 400 (5th Cir. 1981). Although the court apparently considered all "funda-
mental" rights under the NLRA to be fungible, no mention is made of the dichotomies
between indivivdual and collective rights, or between bargaining and concerted action
rights. See id.
120. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1955). The Court accepted
waiver only when satisfied that the full freedom of association inherent in the NLRA was
protected. Id. Where an employee's free selection of a representative for collective bargain-
ing is not influenced by the waiver, the waiver meets policy considerations and is held to be
valid. Id.
121. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 US. 322, 325 (1974). The collective bargaining
agreement in Magnavox permitted the employer to regulate the distribution of literature
and the bulletin boards at the plant. Id. at 323. The Court recognized that the union
waiver of the right to strike had been held permissible as a quid pro quo for the employer's
acceptance of grievance and arbitration procedures. Id. at 325 (citing Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)). The waiver attempted in Magnavox, however, was of
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The Court considered the impact of a union's waiver upon em-
ployees' concerted activities in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB."8
There, the Court found that union allowance of stronger penal-
ties for officials who breach a no-strike clause was theoretically
sound'" as it was "closely related to the economic decision a
union makes when it waives its members' right to strike."' ' A
Second Circuit opinion summarized this analysis as follows: the
union can waive the employees' rights to perform any lawful act if
its purpose is the acquisition of economic benefit.35 These eco-
nomic rights are waivable because the union, as the exclusive
agent of the employee, subject to the duty of fair representation,
is responsible for maximizing the employees' economic advan-
tage." Thus, the workers and the union are seen as having a
"commonality of interests" over economic matters, an identity of
purpose which is lacking in the area of employee selection of a
bargaining representative.'M
A. Prudential Insurance Co.
In Prudential, the NLRB held that a collective-bargaining agree-
ment could waive employees' Weingarten rights."" The decision
communication rights at the plant. 415 U S. at 325. This was not seen as an economic ploy.
Id. Union manipulation of the means of communication in the workplace could chill the
employees' full exercise of choice in selecting a bargaining representative as the union
could close an avenue of publicity for cimpaigns adverse to it. Id. at 325-26.
122. 460 U.S. 693, 705-06 (1983).
123. Id. at 706. The collective-bargaining agreement in Metropolitan Edison contained a
no-strike clause which was breached by union officials and members; the officials received
harsher discipline than the rank-and-file employees although they did not lead the strike,
460 U.S. at 695-97. The NLRB found this to constitute discrimination against the union
officials, which deprived them of their section 7 rights to engage in concerted activity. See
id. at 703. The Court recognized that the bases for the validity of the earlier waivers were
the "union's premise of fair representation" of the employees and that the selection pro-
cess remained unfettered. Id. at 705 (citing Magnavox, 415 U.S. at 325). Fair representation
involves the union's duty in bargaining to enhance its members' economic position. See
Mastro Plastics, 350 U.S. at 280. The Metropolitan Edison Court summarized: "[A] union
may bargain away its members' economic rights, but it may not surrender rights that im-
pair the employees' choice of their bargaining representative." 460 U.S. at 705-06.
124. Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 706.
125. NLRB v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, 746 F.2d 143, 150 (2d Cir. 1984).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 150-51.
128. Sea Prudential Ins. Co., 275 N.L.R.B. No. 30, slip op. at -, (Apr. 25, 1985), 119
L.R.R.M. 1073, 1074-75 (1985). Prudential involved a 1956 collective bargaining agree-
ment clause which read in part: "The union further agrees that neither the Union nor its
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reviewed and applied Metropolitan Edison,'" which recognized the
right of unions to bargain away statutory protections of individu-
als in order to secure collective gains.'3 The Board noted that
Weingarten rights, although triggered by one employee who alone
has an immediate stake in the outcome, serve to protect all mem-
bers of the bargaining unit."' Since all employees are involved,
their bargaining representative also gains an "important stake in
the process."132 Therefore, Prudential holds, these rights are sub-
ject to being used by the union as a bargaining chip when negoti-
ating with the employer.'"
The principles of Metropolitan Edison do not readily apply to
Weingarten rights.'"0 The union, under the Supreme Court ration-
ale, as the exclusive repository of the employees' right to bargain
over terms and conditions of employment, is authorized to waive
employee rights in the exercise of their bargaining function.'"
The Weingarten representative does not carry any bargaining
power, therefore there is less reason to sacrifice employees'
rights.1" Also, the unfortunate use of the label "economic rights"
by the Supreme Court1 7 makes it appear that only collective
rights which contemplate economic gain for the unit are waiv-
able; ' " conversely, Weingarten rights are exercised by one
members shall interfere with the rights of the Employer... [to interview any Agent with
respect to any phase of his work without the grievance committee being present." Id. Al-
though this clause pre-dated the development of Weingarten-style rights by many years and
despite its reference to a "grievance committee," the present Board found that it consti-
tuted a clear and unmistakable waiver of the employees' Weingarten rights. 119 L.R.R.M. at
1075.
129. 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
130. Set 460 U.S. at 705.
131. 119 L.R.R.M. at 1075 (citing Sears, Roebuck. 274 N.L.R.B. No. 55, slip op. at 6-7,
118 L.R.R.M. at 1330). See also Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260.
132. 119 L.R.R.M. at 1075. "Because the union's duty of fair representation allows for
flexibility in collective bargaining negotiations with the employer. the Weingartn right, like
the right to strike, is subject to being waived by the union." Id.
133. Id.; see infia notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
135. See Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 706.
136. See Weingartan, 420 U.S. at 259.
137. Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 705-06. In Metropolitan Edison, the Court limited
the waiver power of unions to "economic rights." Id.
138. Id. at 705. The illustrations of "economic rights' provided by the Court in Metro-
politan Edison are limited to those involving strikes and picket lines. Id.
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employee.'
It is suggested that these apparent distinctions between Wein-
garten rights and "economic rights" do not prevent a finding of
waivability. Under the Second Circuit's interpretation of Metropol-
itan Edison,'" the employees' "economic rights" are equated with
the union's exercise of the collective rights of the employees.14 1
Individual employee rights exercised in conjunction with the
union therefore are waivable. 14 An employee's Weingarten request
is therefore concerted activity,14 3 and in an organized workplace,
it is exercised under the aegis of the union,1" which seeks to en-
hance or preserve the employees' terms and conditions.'" Both
the union and the individual employee, therefore, share the com-
monality of interests necessary to ensure the integrity of the
NLRA scheme of employee protections." It is suggested that for
that reason union waiver of Weingarten rights is permissible.
The Prudential decision reaches this same conclusion but for
possibly the wrong reason.1 4 The Board does not offer a rationale
to explain how the "important stake" the union has in the Wein-
garten process'" translates into the ability to waive workers'
rights.'" The Board recalled its recent holding in Sears, Roebuck,
which limited the exercise of Weingarten rights to organized em-
ployees,' " and said that because the union has flexibility in con-
ducting collective bargaining with the employer, Weingarten rights
139. See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262-63.
140. See Niagara Machine, 746 F.2d 143, 150 (2d Cir. 1984); supra notes 125-27 and
accompanying text.
141. See Niagara Machine. 746 F.2d at 150. The Second Circuit, in Niagara Machine,
describes economic rights as the rights that the employees - acting in concert through a
collective bargaining agent - may exercise in attempts to gain economic advantage. I& (cit-
ing NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Products, Inc., 403 F.2d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1968)).
142. See Niagara Machine, 746 F.2d at 150.
143. See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260.
144. See Materials Reearch, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1012. The majority opinion in Materials
Research recognized that, at an organized facility, the employee generally seeks the assis-
tance of the union. Id.
145. 29 U.S.C. I 159(a) (1982).
146. Compare Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260 (employee and union acting in concert to
preserve employee's terms and conditions of employment) with Niagara Madine, 746 F.2d
at 150-51 (union and employee share the same interest when pursuing economic goals).
147. See infta notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
148. See 119 L.R.R.M. at 1075.
149. See id.
150. Sears. Rmbuck, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1329.
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are waivable. 151 The reliance on Sears, Roebuck makes it appear
that the current Board viewed Weingarten rights as elements of the
union's exclusive right of representation. 162 It is suggested that
the finding in Prudential that such rights are waivable hints that
the Board based its position on the notion that Weingarten rights,
like other representational rights, are subject to waiver. This
would mark a return to the approach the pre-Weingarten Board
espoused; that is, representation at investigatory interviews is part
of the union's bargaining rights.'" This approach was abandoned
when the concept developed that these rights arise not from the
section 9(a) right of exclusivity, but from employees' section 7
rights to concerted action.'" Prudential, then, suggests a rein-
forcement of the Sears, Roebuck rationale; but, as Prudential notes,
Weingarten is a section 7 right and, it is submitted, a waivability
theory cannot properly be based on the union representation
right.
IV. CONCLUSION
Authorities deliberating on labor issues are often anxious to af-
fix their own brand of jurisprudence.'" Likewise, the Reagan
Board, marking an ideological shift, was eager to remedy the per-
ceived excesses of its predecessors."
The NLRB, in Taracorp, arguably sought to rectify a situation
which permitted malfeasants to "get off on a technicality" and
thus saddled the employer with both an unsatisfactory employee
151. 119 L.R.R.M. at 1074-75.
152. Cf. 119 L.R.R.M. at 1074-75. "Although [this) right is triggered only by an em-
ployee's request, and although that employee alone may have an immediate stake in the
outcome ... it is clear that the exclusive bargaining representative also has an important
stake." Id.
153. Western Electric Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 623, 526 (1972). See also Texaco, Inc., 168
N.L.R.B. 361, 362 (1967) (failure to permit representative at investigative interview vio-
lates employer's duty to bargain), enforcement denied, 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969); Shell Oil
Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 161, 164-65 (1951) (union waiver of grievance rights during bargaining).
154. J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446, 449 (1973); Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B.
1052, 1052 (1972), enforcement denied, 482 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1973).
155. See Bierman, Judge Posner and the N.LR.B.: Implications for Labor Law Reform, 69
MiNN. L Rev. 881. 906 (1985).
156. See Bierman, Reflections on the Problem of Labor Board Instability, 62 DEN. U.L. REv.
551, 551 (1985).
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and an interference with managerial prerogatives.157 The Board's
decision was based on an uncritical study of section 10(c) which,
while susceptible to a differring analysis, is a good faith construc-
tion of the law."" The result leaves the employee with a Board
remedy of a cease-and-desist order, a measure least likely to ad-
dress any injury the employee may have suffered and certainly
least effective in creating any deterren'e.15 ' It is suggested that
this decision will act as a signal to employers to all but ignore
Weingarten rights and is an attempt by the Board to effectuate a
back-door reversal of Weingarten.
The Board's decision in Sears, Roebuck is less defensible.'" The
Board, in desiring to limit Weingarten as much as possible, en-
gaged in an unusual construction of both the role of the Wein-
garten representative" t and the statutory basis for the right."
This interpretation has the immediate result of dispossessing all
non-union employees from their Supreme Court recognized
rights," further suggesting an attempt to neutralize Weingarten.
Standing on firmer footing is the Prudential decision.1" Insofar
as it purports to follow the Supreme Court's Metropolitan Edison
decision, Prudential is sound.'" The motivation for the decision,
however, was probably the same as in Sears, Roebuck.'" To this
extent, Prudential reaffirms an incorrect reading of Weingarten, "
and promotes the restrictive construction of the NLRA subscribed
to by this Board.1"
157. Cf. Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54, slip op. at 9.
158. See id. at 6.
159. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982). The Board is bound, under section 10(c), to take
affirmative action "as will effectuate the policies of the Act." Id. See generally Comment,
NLRB Remedies - Moving into di Jt Age, 27 BAYtA L Rzrv. 292, 292-304 (1975) (discussing
adequacy of remedies).
160. See supra notes 88-116 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
163. Se Sears, Roebuck, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1330.
164. Prudential Ins. Co., 275 N.L.R.B. No. 30 (Apr. 25, 1985). 119 L.R.R.M. 1073,
1074-75. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
168. Cf. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1018 n.36 (Van de Water, dissenting).
While the Supreme Court stated that the nature of the Weingarten right is to engage in
concerted activity at an adverse interview, 420 U.S. at 260, Chairman Van de Water stated
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The philosophy of this Board is decidedly conservative and
more pro-management, in comparison with its predecessors.1"
The ideology the current Board espouses is perfectly valid; its
judgment of labor policy may be that which is best suited to
America in the eighties. However, the interplay of the Board's po-
litical beliefs and precedent leaves unsatisfying results.17
While the Weingarten doctrine is not the cornerstone of labor's
rights, it was firmly established by the Supreme Court that it
"plainly effectuates the most fundamental purposes of the Act."171
Undoubtedly, an employee's assertion of this right can be an in-
convenience to the employer who may see it as an improper inter-
ference with his business; the principles of Weingarten may even
constitute unsound law, 172 but this is not the issue. As stated, the
Supreme Court has recognized the protected status of the rights;
the Board may criticize that opinion, but they should not seek to
nullify it. Good faith constructions of the law are the province of
the NLRB; deliberate misconstructions to achieve a policy goal
differing from the Court's are not only institutionally unsound,
but create bad law.l 8
Thomas V. Walsh
that the doctrine involved the employee right to be free from employer interference with
the workers' representation by their duly chosen agent, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1018 n.36 (Van de
Water, dissenting). The purpose of the Act is to promote the cause of labor to a point of
theoretical equilibrium with management. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). It is submitted that the
Board's construction of Weingarten rights belies a view of the NLRA as labor-repressive,
rather than labor-expansive.
169. Modjeska, supra note 8, at 95.
170. See Bierman, supra note 156, at 551. An example of the effect of ideology is the
language in Taracorp decrying the "bad policy" of the earlier Boards. 273 N.L.R.B. No.
54, slip op. at 8-9. It is suggested that although this rationale was didta, the actual motiva-
tion for the three decisions discussed lies there. The Board members "believe that the
expansionist approach to Weingartn has disserved the labor-management community and
that both parties would benefit from a refusal to grant make-whole remedies." 273
N.L.R.B. No. 54, slip op. at 9.
171. Wengarten, 420 U.S. at 261.
172. See Hunter, Weingarten Riddles: Answers from Metropolitan Edison?, 36 N.Y.U.
ANN. NAT'L CON. ON LABOR 12.1, 12-2 (1983). Board member Robert P. Hunter noted that
"the whole gamut of the Weingarten question may not be capable of common sense admin-
istration except within the framework of specific language of a collective agreement ....
Id.
173. See Bierman, supra note 155, at 881-82.
